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1 Introduction outright restrictions and/or a "cooling o¤"period on the passage from the public to the private sector have been enacted in many countries. 4 In this paper we attempt to develop a formal model with multiple regulators and …rms that captures two distinct elements involved in understanding revolving doors, and we refer to these aspects as human capital transfer and collusion building. To elaborate a bit, we observe that it may well be in the interest of a …rm to try to acquire expertise in the (possibly complex) laws that are binding given the scope of a …rm's activities. The experience that a "high quality" former bureaucrat brings to the …rm enables a …rm to deal with the legal framework more e¢ ciently and e¤ectively. In other words, the acquisition of a former civil servant can be interpreted as a process of enriching human capital of the …rm. High quality bureaucrats, in turn, may choose to send appropriate signals to "strengthen"or "promote"their case. In this context, revolving doors become a natural part of an allocation mechanism that enhances mobility of labor with specialized skills. 5 On the other hand, …rms and regulators may seek to build a collusion that a leniency in the enforcement of current laws (when there is discretion in interpreting the laws or loopholes known to the specialists) enhances the prospects for a future (for example, promise to introduce or amend laws in exchange for campaign contributions). We wish to thank a referee for raising the issues related to the proper interpretation as well as limited scope of our model. 4 In the United States, a 1962 act (18 U.S.C. 207(a)) provided for a one-year cooling-o¤ period (Gely and Zardkoohi (2001) ). Most countries have similar post-government-employment restrictions. According to a survey by Brezis and Weiss (1997) , Canada uses a period of 1.5 or 2 years, the U.K. 2 years, France 5 years, Japan 2 years and Israel 1 year. 5 Although the revolving-doors topic shares some features with the literatures on regulatory capture as one channel to in ‡uence public administrators (see La¤ont and Tirole (1996), Dal Bo (2006) and Armstrong and Sappington (2007) ) and with "in ‡uence-peddling" as one category of corruption (see Elliott (1997) ), the human capital aspect makes it distinct from the standard literature on regulatory capture and corruption. Che (1995) introduced the signaling aspect of revolving doors from the human capital perspective …rst, but in his paper, he uses two separate models: a model with signaling e¤ects and a static model with collusion. association. This is troublesome particularly when the future rewards come in the form of a side contract that is not easy to challenge, and an explicit illegal bribe is replaced by a credible understanding in a collusion. 6 At the cost of signi…cant analytical di¢ culties, we have chosen to portray the interaction between bureaucrats and …rms as one with multiple …rms. 7 This approach is more realistic in many contexts, 8 and also create a broader range of incentives.
If there is a single …rm, the two incentives of regulators may be in con ‡ict: for signaling one's expertise, a quali…ed o¢ cial must regulate stringently, but for collusion building, leniency is called for. With multiple …rms, observing stringent regulation for one speci…c …rm no longer guarantees that a regulator is performing his duties: he may be in collusion with the other …rm(s).
We start out by introducing a one-stage game with two regulators and two …rms.
Each regulator is either "quali…ed" or "unquali…ed." The …rm cannot observe the quali…cation level or skill of the o¢ cial but knows the probability of quali…cation.
The case with no PGEO is contrasted with the one where the bureaucrat has PGEO: it is shown that, in the latter case, the quali…ed bureaucrat regulates more stringently to signal his ability.
Section 3 contains the main analysis in the framework of a repeated game. We show that there exists a wage for the quali…ed regulator that maximizes the sum of his payo¤ and the colluding …rm's payo¤ in an equilibrium in which the quali…cations of each regulator are revealed through signaling. We call it a collusion-maximizing equilibrium in the in…nitely repeated game (CME). Given a CME, the quali…ed bu-6 See Martimort (1999) who asserted the need to study collusion among these agents within a framework of "reputation building" through a repeated game. Salant (1995) and Brezis and Weiss (1997) study revolving doors with a repeated game framework, but neither includes the human capital aspect. Moreover, Che (1995) and Salant (1995) …nd that such mobility could bene…t society. Our conclusions open up opposite possibilities. 7 No previous work on revolving doors or even regulatory capture has noticed how introducing this new environment, multiple …rms, can change the behavior of government o¢ cials. 8 For example, none of the major defense companies above in Adams (1982) is a monopoly. reaucrat manipulates regulation rates for two …rms 9 by regulating the colluding …rm leniently for the maximized sum, but regulating the non-colluding …rm stringently 10 for the signaling in order to "compensate"for the lenient regulation toward the colluding …rm. 11 For comparative statics with a CME, it is shown that as the bene…ts from the collusion increase, this gap between the two …rms becomes wider.
Section 4 provides an account of policy implications. The much discussed and widely practiced restrictions on PGEOs have (surprisingly) no e¤ect on regulation rates, and we suggest an alternative policy involving penalties for leniency. Concluding remarks are in Section 5, and all proofs are collected in an appendix.
Model: a one-stage game
Consider a game with two regulators and two identical …rms. 12 The one-stage game consists of two periods. At the beginning of period 1, the …rst regulator works for the government when he is "young", and at the end of the period, he is approached by 9 For the inquisitive reader, we note that our second paper on in ‡uence peddling, "A Model of In ‡uence Peddling," studies how PGEOs and regulation rates a¤ect the former bureaucrats'wages earned using a …rst-price, sealed bid auction. However, we do not attempt to summarize the results of our exploration to avoid adding signi…cantly to the length of the present paper. We thank a referee for his interest in this topic. 1 0 Often, this type of discrimination is neither veri…able nor detectable. For example, suppose that given its capacity, a tax agent can carry out a small percentage, say twenty percent, of the returns …led by …rms. The tax agent can choose two things: select two out of a sample of ten, and examine each case strictly or not. The following is perhaps one of a few cases that only get caught (here, the former o¢ cer was rewarded with a bribe instead of a job unlike this paper, which can be regarded as an implicit legal bribe and of course, is harder to catch). "The Busan District Prosecutors'O¢ ce arrested former presidential protocol secretary Jeong Yun-jae on bribery and in ‡uence-peddling charges for facilitating the bribe of a business man to avoid a tax audit. The business man has admitted to the bribes, and the tax o¢ cial has also been arrested." (p. 719, International Lawyer Year-in-Review. Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2008.) 1 1 Otherwise, the unquali…ed regulator can imitate their strategy. 1 2 We choose 2 …rms for expository simplicity. the …rms with wage o¤ers. 13 Accepting one of the o¤ers, he works for the relevant …rm in period 2 when he is "old."At the beginning of period 2, the second regulator is born and works for the government when he is young. Hence, in period 1, the …rst regulator lives as a government o¢ cial, and in period 2, the …rst regulator lives as an employee for one of the …rms, and the second regulator as a government o¢ cial.
The two …rms live for the entire stage.
Each regulator is either quali…ed (q = H) or unquali…ed (q = L). The …rms cannot directly observe the quali…cations level q 2 fH; Lg, but they know the likelihood that a regulator is quali…ed, which is given by Pr(q = H) = 2 (0; 1). A quali…ed regulator acquires regulatory expertise and (or) insider information gained from experience in government, whereas an unquali…ed regulator has no such advantage over other employees working for non-governmental sectors, and after the …rst regulator retires, the …rms wish to hire the former regulator in order to utilize his or her experience in government.
While working for the government, each regulator chooses a "regulation rate" for each …rm, denoted by (r 1 ; r 2 ) 2 R 2 + . A regulation rate indicates the level of monitoring e¤ort or performance in terms of intensity and/or frequency. The cost of the regulation is denoted by e q : R + ! R + for q 2 fH; Lg. e q captures the trade-o¤ between expected "penalties" for being lenient in regulating a …rm 14 and "personal costs" from being stringent. p : R + ! R + denotes the former, and c q : R + ! R + the latter. In other words, a unit increase in the regulation rate has both marginal bene…ts and costs. Hence, for each r, we have e q (r) = p (r) + c q (r).
We assume that for each q, r > 0, c q (0) = 0, c 0 q (0) = 0, c 0 q (r) > 0, c 00 q (r) > 0 and lim r!+1 c 0 q (r) = +1; for each r > 0, p 0 (0) < 0, p 0 (r) 0 and p 00 (r) 0. 15 1 3 If the former regulator works as a lobbyist outside of the …rms, this wages can be interpreted as fees for a contract with him broadly.
1 4 The expected penalty consists of the probability that each regulator will be caught by the government and the amount of the penalty.
1 5 p is a decreasing function on r > 0, so after a certain point, it can be constant.
The two …rms are in "Bertrand competition," so they earn zero pro…ts if they comply with regulations and laws. However, each …rm can obtain positive expected payo¤ y q : R + ! R + by hiring a former regulator and either by not complying with regulations and laws or by exploiting loopholes. y q depends on whether the …rm hires a quali…ed former regulator, that is, 16
given the same regulation rate r by the incumbent regulator. If the …rm hires a quali…ed former regulator, the …rm's payo¤ is higher than otherwise. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that given each q, r > 0, y 0 q (0) = 0, y 0 q (r) < 0, and y 00 q (r) 0. The higher the level of monitoring e¤ort the lower the payo¤ involving explicit or implicit illegal activities, so y q is assumed to be a strictly decreasing function on r > 0.
Finally, we introduce Spence-Mirrlees property (SMP): for each r 0,
which implies that the marginal cost of a quali…ed regulator is lower than that of an unquali…ed regulator. 17 The following Lemma shows that SMP entails that c L dominates c H by the strictly increasing di¤erences and will be useful for proofs in what follows.
Lemma 1 SMP implies that for any r 0 > r 0, e L r 0 e H r 0 > e L (r) e H (r) :
Lemma 1 also means that for any r > 0, e L (r) e H (r) > 0. 18 A one-stage game consists of two sub-cases: one with no PGEO and the other with PGEO.
1 6 Hence, a quali…ed regulator can expect a higher wage only when his or her type is revealed.
This assumption is not special in that "quali…ed" agents always have higher productivity in the signaling literature.
1 7 Given the tax agent example in the introduction, the quali…ed regulator is the one who has "lower" cost of examining a case very hard.
1 8 Note that eq is U-shaped for each q.
Without PGEO
Without PGEO, neither regulator wishes to exert any e¤ort on regulation different from the cost-minimizing regulation rate given each type. Denote r q := arg min r2R + e q (r) for each q. Then, a unique r q > 0 exists. 19 Lemma 2 shows that without PGEO, the high type's regulation rate is greater than the low type's regulation rate.
Lemma 2 Without PGEO, the high type's regulation rate is greater than the low type's regulation rate, that is r H > r L > 0.
Hence, without PGEO, there is no incentive for either type of the regulators to deviate from r q . However, with PGEO, the …rms can infer q through the regulation rates.
With PGEO
Without PGEO, both the …rst and second regulators choose r q for q 2 fH; Lg.
Even with PGEO, the second regulator will behave just as he does without PGEO since in the one-stage game, the second regulator is the last in the time sequence.
However, given PGEO, the …rst regulator wishes to signal his quali…cations using the regulation rates for both …rms.
( Figure 1 here) The time line, described in Figure 1 , can be seen formally as follows: 20
Step 1: Nature chooses q for the …rst regulator.
Step 2: The …rst regulator chooses regulation rates for both …rms (r 1 ; r 2 ). 1 9 p 00 (r) 0 implies that for any r > 0, p 0 (r) p 0 (0). Since p 0 (r) is bounded from below, limr!+1 e 0 q (r) = +1. Hence, e 0 q (0) < 0, limr!+1 e 0 q (r) = +1 and e 00 q (r) > 0.
Step 3: Given (r 1 ; r 2 ), the two …rms make inferences about the …rst regulator's quali…cations.
Step 4: After the …rst regulator retires, the two …rms simultaneously make wage o¤ers (w 1 ; w 2 ).
Step 5: The …rst regulator decides which …rm to work for.
Step 6: Nature chooses q for the second regulator.
Step 7: The second regulator determines regulation rates for both …rms.
Since
Step 7 is the last stage, the second regulator does not have PGEO. It follows from Lemma 2 that a quali…ed second regulator chooses r H , and an unquali…ed one r L .
A strategy of …rm i is a mapping from R 2 + to R + such that
Hence, if the type of the …rst regulator is revealed, the payo¤s of …rm i when he is quali…ed and when he is not, respectively, are 21
A strategy of the …rst regulator is a mapping from fH; Lg to R 2 + such that (r 1 ; r 2 ) = (R 1 (q) ; R 2 (q)), and the payo¤ of the …rst regulator is
where 2 (0; 1) is the common discount factor for the one period.
A strategy pro…le in the one-stage game is a sequential equilibrium if for each step in the time line, the strategy of each player is the best response to the other players'strategies, and …rms'beliefs about the …rst regulator's types are updated by 2 1 Note again that rH and rL are the regulation rates of the second regulator.
Bayes' rule. 22 A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both types choose same actions, that is, (R 1 (H) ; R 2 (H)) = (R 1 (L) ; R 2 (L)), whereas a separating equilibrium is one in which both types choose di¤erent actions, (R 1 (H) ; R 2 (H)) 6 = (R 1 (L) ; R 2 (L)), so their types are revealed in an equilibrium. We focus on a sequential equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion. The intuitive criterion typically eliminates pooling equilibria if the high type can attain a higher payo¤ by deviating from a pooling equilibrium (see Cho and Kreps (1987) for details). 23 In what follows, an equilibrium refers to a sequential equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion.
An unquali…ed regulator is one who has not acquired regulatory expertise, so we assume that the …rms can hire many employees of the same quality as the unquali…ed regulator from elsewhere. A perfectly competitive labor market exists in which …rms can hire such employees given w L . Hence, w L is the wage that the unquali…ed regulator can obtain from PGEO in a separating equilibrium. 24 Let y L (r H ) +
(1 ) y L (r L ) w L = 0 so that the payo¤ of a …rm hiring the unquali…ed former regulator is zero from PGEO in a separating equilibrium. Denote w H := y H (r H ) +
(1 ) y H (r L ), and since for each r, y H (r) > y L (r), we have w H > w L .
The two …rms are identical and make wage o¤ers simultaneously, so w H is the wage that the quali…ed regulator can obtain in a separating equilibrium such as is found in Bertrand competition cases. For a separating equilibrium, we introduce the individual rationality condition for the low type:
2 2 Since there are only two types, the sets of perfect Bayesian equilibria and sequential equilibria coincide (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ).
2 3 Hence, in the one-stage game, the …rst regulator is the "sender" of signals, and the two …rms are the "receivers." and the incentive compatibility conditions:
Consider a maximization problem and denote by (r 1 ; r 2 ) a solution to (2).
where
Lemma 3 establishes that the set of equilibrium strategies and the set of solutions to (2) coincide.
Lemma 3 If (IR) is satis…ed, (i) no pooling equilibrium exists.
(ii) the set of equilibrium strategies is the same as the set of solutions to (2).
We show that with PGEO in a one-stage game, an equilibrium exists and (r 1 ; r 2 )
is at least as large as the high type's regulation rate without PGEO. 25
Proposition 1 If (IR) is satis…ed, with PGEO in a one-stage game, (i) an equilibrium exists.
(ii) r 1 r H and r 2 r H .
Hence, the existence of PGEO in a one-stage game is bene…cial to society since the quali…ed regulator voluntarily wishes to increase the regulation rates for both 2 5 Since the incentive compatibility condition for the low type is a strictly convex function of r,
we have to utilize SMP and necessary conditions of the maximization problem to characterize the solution to (2). Hence, this problem is not as trivial as it might look.
…rms in order to deter the unquali…ed regulator from imitating the quali…ed regulator's strategy, and this result echoes Che (1995) . The following Corollary shows (i) that if (r H ; r H ) = 2 B, then, the quali…ed regulator strictly increases the regulation rates for both …rms with PGEO, and (ii) a su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness. 26 Corollary 1 Suppose that (IR) is satis…ed.
is strictly monotone on (r H ; +1), r 1 = r 2 and the equilibrium regulation pro…le is unique.
In a one-stage game, with PGEO, the quali…ed regulators have no incentive other than to signal their quali…cations through the regulation rates, which leads to greater regulation rates. On the other hand, the …rms do not have strong incentive not to comply with regulations and laws since they obtain zero pro…ts either way.
However, in an in…nitely repeated game, a sequence of quali…ed regulators and a …rm can collude in order to attain higher payo¤s.
Model: a repeated game
Consider an in…nitely repeated game in which there is a sequence of regulators, and in each period, two regulators and two …rms play the one-stage game described in the previous section. Hence, each regulator lives for two periods, and the …rms live in…nitely, so the regulators are "short-run players,"and the two …rms are "long-run players." 27 At the beginning of period t for each t = 1; 2; 3:::, the tth regulator works 2 6 Since the choice set is not convex, without any additional structure on eq, it is not clear whether the regulation rates for both …rms are the same in an equilibrium, and whether the solution to (11) is unique.
for the government when he is young, and at the end of the period, he is approached by the …rms with wage o¤ers. Accepting one of the o¤ers, he works for the relevant …rm in period t + 1 when he is old. At the beginning of period t + 1, the (t + 1)th regulator works for the government when he is young. Hence, except for period 1, for each period t, the (t 1)th regulator lives as an employee for one of the …rms, and the tth regulator lives as a government o¢ cial.
Let q(t) denote the type of the regulator in period t (t = 1; 2; 3; :::). Only the regulator in period t knows the realized value of q(t), and the other players know that q(t) is independently and identically drawn with probability Pr(q(t) = H) = 2 (0; 1). Similarly, action variables in period t can be written by (w 1 (t); w 2 (t)) and
(r 1 (t); r 2 (t)). The regulation rates and the wages paid to each regulator are publicly observable to all players in every period afterward. Denote the history up to t by H(t) := fw 1 (1); w 2 (1); r 1 (1); r 2 (1); :::; w 1 (t); w 2 (t); r 1 (t); r 2 (t)g. A strategy of each player in period t is a mapping from his or her information about the past history of the game H(t 1) to his or her actions. In particular, a regulator's strategy in period t is a mapping from H(t 1) fH; Lg to R 2 + . In the repeated game, we study types of collusion between the sequence of regulators and …rms such that quali…ed regulators collude with one of the …rms. We label the …rms (C; N ) instead of (1; 2) to indicate C as a …rm under collusion with the sequence of quali…ed regulators in the repeated game, and r C denotes the regulation rate for the colluding …rm and r N that for the non-colluding …rm. In contrast to the one-stage game, there are still many sequential equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion with collusion in the repeated game, so we select one in Pareto-frontier among them by maximizing the sum of the quali…ed regulator's one-period payo¤ and the colluding …rm's one-period payo¤. 28 extensive form game is "repeated"over time that is a special type of dynamic games. In particular, we invite readers to see the simple example in the …rst paragraph at page 555 in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990) .
Denote by u C and u H the colluding …rm's one-period expected payo¤ from hiring a former regulator and the quali…ed regulator's expected payo¤, respectively: 29
Consider a maximization problem and denote by r := (r C ; r N ) a solution to (4). 30
We construct the following grim strategy for the repeated game. Under collusion, each quali…ed regulator exercises the regulation rate (r C ; r N ), and the colluding …rm hires a former quali…ed regulator at the total wage (w y H + w z H ) in which w y H is a wage o¤er made before he or she works for the …rm, as in the one-stage game, and w z H is the wage paid after he works for the …rm and turns out quali…ed. 31 De…ne 2 9 Note that wH is a transfer between the colluding …rm and the high type.
3 0 As in the one-stage game, the objective function is strictly concave, and the choice set is nonconvex. Lemma 3 also implies that if wH wL, there exists (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) 2 R 2 + satisfying ICs in (1). Hence, for all wH 2 , B (wH ) is not empty. 3 1 w z H can be considered a bonus, and we assume here that each regulator's type is revealed after he or she works for a …rm. This assumption is not idiosyncratic in the signaling literature in the sense that the classical signaling paper, Spence (1973) , assumed it to capture consistency before a formal equilibrium concept was introduced. Of course, we can have the same assumption in the one stage, but it will not a¤ect the results there at all because of the equilibrium concept that we adopt, a sequential equilibrium with intuitive criterion. Notice also that this does not mean that the signaling aspect disappears in the repeated game. The two …rms should make wage o¤ers to regulators before they start working for the …rms as in the one-stage game, and their types can be revealed only through signaling. a defection of the quali…ed regulator as adopting r C > r C , and a defection of the colluding …rm as employing a wage less than (w y H + w z H ). If and when the quali…ed regulators and the colluding …rm learn that a defection has taken place, they apply the equilibrium strategies in the one-stage game thereafter.
Let w N H denote the maximum bid that the non-colluding …rm can make and let u N (w N H ; r N ) be the non-colluding …rm's one-period expected payo¤.
w y H is related to how to make a bigger "pie" for both, and w z H is related to how to divide the pie in order to guarantee that each of them ends up with a higher payo¤ in the repeated game as in (H) and (C). Given the equilibrium, the colluding …rm's bid for the quali…ed regulator is higher than the non-colluding …rm's, so the colluding …rm can secure employment of the quali…ed as in (B). The colluding …rm can make a higher bid in an equilibrium since each …rm's payo¤ is a strictly decreasing function of regulation rates, and r C < r N . 34 3 2 In words, (a) says that the maximum expected payo¤ from (4) is greater than the maximum payo¤ for both in the one-stage game.
3 3 Note that each …rm's payo¤ in the one-stage game is zero.
3 4 The reason that collusion with only one …rm is taking place on the equilibrium path is that the colluding …rm can make a higher bid in every period. One may wonder why then the other …rm should remain silent. Of course, the non-colluding …rm has a greater "incentive" to start colluding with a sequence of regulators, but it does not have such "capacity,"that is, it cannot make a higher bid since its payo¤ is always lower than the colluding …rm's from the beginning (if borrowing is not Then, if is su¢ ciently close to 1, as usual, a collusive equilibrium exists. De…ne
. f is the colluding …rm's expected payo¤ from hiring a former regulator. Then, (4) can be rewritten as
First, we show that a solution r to the maximization problem (6) exists, and characterize it.
Proposition 2 Given any w H 2 , (i) there exists a solution r to the maximization problem (6).
(ii) r N r H and r N > r C > 0.
We say that a collusion-maximizing equilibrium in the in…nitely repeated game (5).
De…nition 1 (r ; w y H ) is a CME if (r ; w y H ) satis…es (a) and (b) in (5).
The solution r to (6) is a function of w H , and the natural candidate for w y H is the one that maximizes the sum of payo¤s, which is denoted by w H . Hence, if (r (w H ) ; w H ) satis…es (a) and (b) in (5), we can show the existence of a CME.
Proposition 3 If (IR) is satis…ed, there exists a CME (r (w H ) ; w H ).
Hence, given a CME (r (w H ) ; w H ), the quali…ed bureaucrat regulates the two …rms with di¤erent rates: for the collusion, the quali…ed bureaucrat must regulate the colluding …rm leniently, but for the signaling in a separating equilibrium, he must allowed). We could think of other types of equilibria, e.g. giving alternating favors to two …rms, but it is not di¢ cult to see that favoring only one …rm (or punishing only one …rm) makes their pie biggest.
regulate the non-colluding …rm stringently in order to compensate for the lenient regulation toward the colluding …rm. 35 Assume that e 0 H dominates e 0 L by the strictly log-increasing di¤erences. 36 This is equivalent to e 00 H (r) e 0 H (r)
for r > r H .
The …rst result of Proposition 4 establishes that a collusion-maximizing pro…le (r (w H ) ; w H ) results in a set of regulation rates (r C ; r N ) such that the regulation rate for the colluding …rm is even lower than the unquali…ed o¢ cial's regulation rate without PGEO. 37 Models with a parameter other than w H will be analyzed in the comparative statics below and in the next section. Denote by 38 r (w H ; ) := (r C (w H ; ) ; r N (w H ; )) a solution to the collusion-maximization problem given w H and a parameter . The second and third results of Proposition 4 imply that given a CME (r (w H ; ) ; w H ),
if at least one of constraints is binding, the changes in a parameter have two e¤ects 3 5 Given the tax agent example in the introduction, the lenient regulation means not to choose a …rm under collusion for tax audit or not to examine the …rm hard if it has to audit it, and the stringent one means the opposite. Since the regulator can choose a di¤erent …rm for the stringent regulation "in turn," it is hard for the other …rm(s) to argue about it or to bring the case to the court.
3 6 We wish to apply a Envelope Theorem to obtain the second result in Proposition 4. The di¢culty with it is, again, the fact that the choice set is not convex, so we cannot apply "conventional" Envelope Theorems. However, Milgrom and Segal (2002) show that if a value function is di¤erentiable, we can use the traditional Envelope formula, so we want to prove that r is di¤erentiable using the Implicit Function Theorem, and (7) is a su¢ cient condition for that. Let's take a simple example satisfying the conditions of eq by assuming that p(r) = r, cH (r) = r 2 =2 and cL(r) = r 2 .
It follows that e 00 H (r)=e 0 H (r) = 1=( 1 + r) and e 00 L (r)=e 0 L (r) = 2=( 1 + 2r), which is clearly the case with (7). on the changes in the solution r (w H ( ); ) of the collusion maximization: a direct e¤ ect and an indirect e¤ ect through w H .
Proposition 4 If (IR) and (7) are satis…ed, given a CME (r (w H ; ) ; w H ), (i) r C < r L and r N > r H .
(ii) r is a unique function of (w H ; ) and di¤ erentiable.
(iii) w H is a unique function of and di¤ erentiable.
For comparative statics, with a slight abuse of notation, we rewrite f (r) as f (r; s) where s 2 S is a parameter with S R and assume that f is di¤erentiable. 39 Let @ 2 f (r; s) @r@s < 0, meaning that the marginal product of regulation is a strictly decreasing function of s. The second main result of this section establishes that if the bene…ts from collusion increase, to maximize the sum of the payo¤s under collusion, each quali…ed regulator strictly decreases the regulation rate for the colluding …rm. However, at the same time, in order to deter each unquali…ed regulator from imitating the quali…ed regulator's strategy, each quali…ed regulator strictly increases the regulation rate for the non-colluding …rm.
Proposition 5 If (IR) and (7) are satis…ed, given a CME (r (w H ; s) ; w H ), for any pair s 0 > s,
This parameterization is quite general. For example, one special case of it is when s is , the likelihood that a regulator is quali…ed. Then, given y 0 q < 0, if SMP between y H and y L is assumed such that for each r, y 0 H (r) > y 0 L (r), we have @ 2 f (r; s) =@r@ > 0, which is exactly the opposite case of Proposition 5. Hence, as the likelihood that a regulator is quali…ed strictly increases, the bene…t from collusion strictly decreases. If (IR) and (7) are satis…ed, given a CME (r (w H ; ) ; w H ), for any
Policy Implications
Until now, policies regarding revolving doors have focused exclusively on postgovernment-employment restrictions. Proposition 6 studies the e¤ect of the number of "cooling-o¤"periods, and we show that post-government-employment restrictions are not e¤ective policies; not to mention the possibility that such restrictions deprive former government o¢ cials of the right to take jobs that require their skills and experience.
Proposition 6 If (IR) and (7) are satis…ed, given a CME (r (w H ; ) ; w H ), postgovernment-employment restrictions have no e¤ ect on regulation rates for both …rms, that is, for any n 2, r C (w H ( n ) ; n ) = r C (w H ( ) ; ) and r N (w H ( n ) ; n ) = r N (w H ( ) ; ) .
Although the direct e¤ect of the changes in on r C is negative, and the direct e¤ect of the changes in on r N is positive, their net e¤ects are zero because of the opposite indirect e¤ects. As long as the collusion-maximization in the repeated game is sustained, the optimal regulation rates will not be a¤ected by the changes in the discount factor. 40
Now, we suggest an alternative policy to induce each quali…ed regulator to be more stringent in regulating the …rm that is in collusion with a sequence of quali…ed 4 0 Recall (IR) with n restricted periods: n wL [eL (rL) + eL (rL)] 0. If n is so small that (IR) is not satis…ed, of course, the result is not valid any more. This claim may be seen too strong since we are assuming that the knowledge that the regulators gained from government does not deteriorate over time.
regulators. We modify p(r) as p (r; t) where t 2 T is a parameter with T R, and let p be di¤erentiable. Let @ 2 p (r; t) @r@t = d < 0,
which implies that as t strictly increases, the magnitude of the marginal expected penalty of the regulation rate strictly increases. 41 Proposition 7 establishes that as the magnitude of the marginal expected penalty strictly increases, the regulation rate for the colluding …rm strictly increases, and the regulation rate for the noncolluding …rm strictly decreases.
Proposition 7 If (IR) and (7) are satis…ed, given a CME (r (w H ; t) ; w H ), it follows from the policy (8) that for any pair t 0 > t,
Concluding Remarks
In our exposition, we have attempted to synthesize three themes: mobility of human capital, signaling and collusion in a framework with a sequence of regulators and two …rms, and we are not aware of any paper that incorporates all these, but this formal model cannot capture the variety of contexts and connotations of "in ‡uence peddling" that one encounters in the vast (informal) literature.
Although the paper builds on well-known equilibrium concepts, we should perhaps stress that our analysis was still challenging at various steps and needed careful reasoning for the following reasons. Observe that the quali…ed regulator's payo¤ maximization in (2) and the collusion maximization in (4) are constrained by a nonconvex choice set, and this non-convexity is caused by the incentive compatibility condition of the low type. Hence, all the "standard" tools for optimization are not su¢ cient to derive important results in this paper.
The comparative statics results can be obtained under (7), and when there are n 3 multiple …rms, the analysis of this paper can be extended either to the case in which each bureaucrat chooses regulation rates after selecting 2 …rms out of n …rms such as the example in the introduction, or to the case in which each bureaucrat regulates one …rm leniently and all the other …rms equally stringently, by substituting (n 1) e q (r N ) and (n 1) e q (r L ) for the n 1 non-colluding …rms given each type of fH; Lg into (4), but not to the other general settings.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof with Lemma 1. Alternatively, we can simply use the result in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) .
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion. Then, the wage that each type can obtain is w :
is su¢ cient to demonstrate that the high type can attain a higher payo¤ by deviating from the pooling equilibrium, and the low type cannot imitate the action of the high type. In other words, we show that given any (r 1 ; r 2 ) 2 R 2 + , there exists (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) 2 R 2 + such that
w [e L (r 1 ) + e L (r 2 )] > w H [e L (r 0 1 ) + e L (r 0 2 )].
Since w H > w and lim r!+1 e 0 q (r) = +1 implies lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, there exists (r 00 1 ; r 00 2 ) > (r 1 ; r 2 ) and (r 00 1 ; r 00 2 ) > (r L ; r L ) such that w [e L (r 1 ) + e L (r 2 )] = w H [e L (r 00 1 ) + e L (r 00 2 )].
It follows from SMP that [e L (r 00 1 ) e H (r 00 1 )] + [e L (r 00 2 ) e H (r 00
2 )] > [e L (r 1 ) e H (r 1 )] + [e L (r 2 ) e H (r 2 )].
Then,
[e L (r 00 1 ) e H (r 00 1 )]+[e L (r 00 2 ) e H (r 00
By (10),
Since e q is continuous, there exists (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) 2 R 2 + such that (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) > (r 00 1 ; r 00 2 ) and (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) is su¢ ciently close to (r 00 1 ; r 00 2 ). Then, (r 0 1 ; r 0 2 ) satis…es (9). (ii) Consider the following maximization problem and denote by (r y 1 ; r y 2 ) the solution to (11). max (r1;r2)2R 2 + w H [e H (r 1 ) + e H (r 2 )] subject to two ICs in (1).
Note that the individual rationality condition of the high type results from (IR). Part 1. If (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion, then (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a solution to (11). Suppose that (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion and (r 1 ; r 2 ) 6 = (r y 1 ; r y 2 ), which implies
By adding two ICs in (1),
It follows from SMP that at least one of (r 1 ; r 2 ) is greater than or equal to r L . WLOG, r y 1 r L . Since lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, there exists r 0 1 > r H such that e H (r 0 1 ) > e H (r y 1 ) and e L is strictly increasing on [r L ; +1), so
Hence, the existence of (r 0 1 ; r y 2 ) contradicts the intuitive criterion. Part 2. If (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a solution to (11), then (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion. Suppose that (r 1 ; r 2 ) does not satisfy the intuitive criterion. Then,
which is a contradiction with the premise that (r 1 ; r 2 ) is a solution to (11).
Hence, the set of separating equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion and the set of solutions to (11) coincide. Now, we show that (11) can be replaced by (2). Note that
Since the set of (r 1 ; r 2 ) satisfying ICs in (1) which in turn implies that (r 1 ; r 2 ) satis…es (1). Hence, (11) can be replaced by (2).
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote
Since e q is continuous, B is closed. In addition, e L is strictly convex and lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, and for each i = 1; 2,
Hence, B is bounded. It follows from the Weierstrass Theorem that w H [e H (r 1 )+e H (r 2 )] attains a local maximum on B at (r 1 ; r 2 ). Furthermore, for any (r 1 ; r 2 ) 2 Bn B,
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists 2 (0; 1) such that
Since e H attains a unique global minimum at r H ,
Thus, (r 1 ; r 2 ) is also a global maximizer.
(ii) We divide this into two cases. Case 1. At least one of (r 1 ; r 2 ) is in [r L ; r H ). WLOG, let r 1 2 [r L ; r H ). Since e L is strictly increasing on [r L ; r H ), and e H is strictly decreasing on [r L ; r H ), there is r 0 1 > r 1 such that w H [e H (r 0 1 ) + e H (r 2 )] > w H [e H (r 1 ) + e H (r 2 )]
and (r 0 1 ; r 2 ) 2 B, which leads to a contradiction. Case 2. At least one of (r 1 ; r 2 ) is in [0; r L ). WLOG, let r 1 2 [0; r L ). Since lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, and e q is continuous, given r 1 2 [0; r L ), there exists r 0 1 > r L such that e L (r 0 1 ) = e L (r 1 ). It follows from SMP that e L (r 0 1 ) e H (r 0 1 ) > e L (r 1 ) e H (r 1 ) , which in turn entails e H (r 0 1 ) < e H (r 1 ). Hence, w H [e H (r 0 1 ) + e H (r 2 )] > w H [e H (r 1 ) + e H (r 2 )] and (r 0 1 ; r 2 ) 2 B. We have a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) By Proposition 1, the maximization problem (2) can be replaced by
Let L := w H [e H (r 1 ) + e H (r 2 )] + ( w L w H + [e L (r 1 ) + e L (r 2 )] [e L (r L ) + e L (r L )]).
The constraint quali…cation condition is satis…ed from the result of Proposition 1. Given the solution (r 1 ; r 2 ) to (13), it follows from the Theorem of Lagrange that there exists 2 R such that e 0 H (r 1 ) + e 0 L (r 1 ) = 0,
e 0 H (r 2 ) + e 0 L (r 2 ) = 0.
If one of (r 1 ; r 2 ) is equal to r H , then = 0, so by (14), the other regulation rate must be r H . We have a contradiction.
(ii) If (r H ; r H ) 2 B, (r 1 ; r 2 ) = (r H ; r H ), so it is trivially true. Let (r H ; r H ) = 2 B. (14) entails that 6 = 0 since otherwise (r 1 ; r 2 ) = (r H ; r H ), a contradiction. Hence,
. The result follows from the condition that e 0 L (r) =e 0 H (r) is strictly monotone on (r H ; +1) and Proposition 1. The uniqueness is an easy consequence of the fact that e H is strictly increasing on (r H ; +1).
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Note that e q is strictly convex and lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, and Case 2. r N 2 [0; r L ). Since lim r!+1 e q (r) = +1, and e q is continuous, given r N 2 [0; r L ), there exists r 0 N > r L such that e L (r 0 N ) = e L (r N ). It follows from SMP that
We have a contradiction. Part 2. r N > r C > 0. First, we show r C > 0. It follows from the result in Part 1. above that the constraint quali…cation condition is satis…ed. Let
The Theorem of Kuhn and Tucker entails that there exists ( ; ; ) 2 R 3 + such that
Suppose r C = 0. Since r N r H , we have e 0 L (r N ) > e 0 H (r N ) > 0, which implies 1 + > . Now, It follows from e 0 H (0) = e 0 L (0) < 0 and f 0 (0) = 0 that
which is a contradiction. Since r C > 0 and r N > 0, (6) can be rewritten as
Let
The Theorem of Kuhn and Tucker entails that there exists ( ; ) 2 R 2 + such that
e 0 H (r N ) e 0 H (r N ) + e 0 L (r N ) = 0.
Suppose r C = r N . Then, we have f 0 (r C ) = 0, a contradiction. Thus, r C 6 = r N . Suppose r C > r N . Let r 0 C = r N and r 0 N = r C . Since f is strictly decreasing,
Moreover, both ICs are satis…ed. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rewrite the incentive compatibility conditions in
Note that the individual rationality condition of the high type results from (12). The value function V and the set-valued function R := (R C ; R N ) are given by Thus, (6) can be replaced by
Step 
Now, let a sequence w m H 2 converge to w H 2 and suppose that (r C ; r N ) 
. Then, (r m C ; r m N ) ! (r C ; r N ). From the construction, the second inequality in (22) is satis…ed.
Since the closure of a lower semicontinuous correspondence is lower semicontinuous, this establishes the lower semicontinuity of the correspondence b B.
Step 2. The existence of w H .
It follows from the Maximum Theorem that R is upper semicontinuous. Then, there
Step 3. 
By the de…nition of w H ,
(24) implies the strict inequality below. f 00 (r C ) e 00 H (r C ) + e 00 L (r C ) 0 e 0 L (r C ) 0 e 00 H (r N ) + e 00 L (r N ) e 0 L (r N ) e 0 L (r C ) e 0 L (r N ) 0 3 7 7 7 5 .
Since the collusion-maximization problem attains a maximum at r , the matrix above is negative semide…nite. Then, f 00 (r C ) e 00 H (r C )+ e 00 L (r C ) 0 and e 00 H (r N )+ e 00 L (r N ) 0. By (7) and
It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that r is a unique function of w H and di¤erentiable. The Envelope Theorem entails that
which in turn implies a corner solution at w H = w L . However, if w H = w L , (r C ; r N ) = (r L ; r L ), and we have a contradiction with Proposition 2.
(i) Hence, both ICs in (19) must be binding. By adding two ICs,
Since r N > r L , SMP entails that r C < r L .
(ii) Since both ICs must be binding, from (18), Denote
:= e 00 H (r N ) e 00 H (r N ) + e 00 L (r N ) .
De…ne a matrix A as below:
A := 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 Then,
Moreover, since r C < r L and r N > r L , SMP and the result in (i) above imply that e 0 L (r C ) e 0 L (r N ) < 0, and
Hence, det A > 0. It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that r is a unique function of (w H ; ) and di¤erentiable.
(iii) The Envelope Theorem entails that @V (w H ) @w H = .
If 6 = 0, a contradiction as above. Since the collusion-maximization problem attains a maximum at r , the matrix D 2 L from (17) 
It follows from (7) that < 0. Suppose = 0, by (26), = = e 00 H (r N ) e 00 L (r N ) e 00 H (r N )
.
On the other hand, by the …rst order conditions, = = e 0 H (r N ) e 0 L (r N ) e 0 H (r N )
, which implies that e 00 H (r N ) e 0 H (r N ) = e 00 L (r N ) e 0 L (r N )
. This violates the assumption (7). Hence, @ (w H (s) ; s) @w H @ (w H (s) ; s) @w H < 0.
The result follows from the Implicit Function Theorem.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, we can derive the following condition between w H and a parameter .
We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1.
@r C @w H < 0, @r N @w H > 0. Write a matrix in (28). Note that by SMP and (27) 
Similarly, @r N @w H = [e 0 L (r C ) e 0 H (r C )] [e 0 H (r N ) e 0 L (r C ) e 0 H (r C ) e 0 L (r N )] det A > 0.
Step 2.
@w H @s > 0. Write a matrix:
A 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 @r C @s @r N @s @ @s @ @s The last inequality follows from (27) and SMP. (30) and (29) imply the result.
Step 3. Proof of Proposition 6.
Post-government-employment restrictions make each regulator attain a lower discounted present-value of a future wage. (25) The Cramer's rule entails
It follows from (30) and (29) (31) and (32) with the results above imply dr C (w H ( ) ; ) d = @r C (w H ( ) ; ) @w H @w H @ + @r C (w H ( ) ; ) @ = 0, dr N (w H ( ) ; ) d = @r N (w H ( ) ; ) @w H @w H @ + @r N (w H (s) ; ) @ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote := [ @p(r L ;t) @t @p(r C ;t) @t ] + [ @p(r L ;t) @t @p(r N ;t) @t
].
Write a matrix:
Then, SMP, (27) and (8) (31) and (32) with the results above imply dr C (w H (t) ; t) dt = @r C (w H (t) ; t) @w H @w H @t + @r C (w H (t) ; t) @t = @r C (w H (t) ; t) @w H ( ) > 0, dr N (w H (t) ; t) dt = @r N (w H (t) ; t) @w H @w H @t + @r N (w H (s) ; t) @t = @r N (w H (t) ; t) @w H ( ) < 0.
